Hezbollah’s strengths in a ground confrontation with the Israeli army
We remember that the day after the attacks by the Israeli army in the southern suburbs of Beirut which resulted in the assassination of several Hezbollah leaders, including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, the Israeli government, which did not hide its joy and enthusiasm, promised all his adversaries in the region hell and hammered home that the Israeli army was capable of achieving any objective in the region. Better still, Netanyahu began to dream of a new geopolitical map in the Middle East in which Israel was sure to have first place.
The Iranian ballistic response has somewhat calmed the enthusiasm of the Israeli government. The Israeli representative to the United Nations was forced to tone down, declaring that “the Israeli response to the Iranian attack will be calculated.”
But Israel’s troubles do not end there. On the Lebanese front, the first operations do not bode well. The ground incursion of Israeli Special Forces into southern Lebanon ended in a fiasco according to the Israeli media themselves.
The first two clashes between Israeli Special Forces and Hezbollah fighters left 8 dead in the Israeli ranks (3 captains and 3 sergeants belonging to the Etzioni commando brigade and 2 chief sergeants from the Golani brigade) and 39 wounded evacuated to rescued by several Israeli army rescue helicopters.
Furthermore, Hezbollah fighters managed to destroy 3 Merkava tanks. The failure of the first land incursion of the Israeli army, which did not exceed 400 meters on Lebanese soil, augurs a war that the Israeli leaders themselves describe as “difficult” and “painful”.
As a reminder, at the start of the so-called land incursion operation of the Israeli army which began Monday evening, only the 98e Division, which was deployed in Gaza and which includes a paratrooper brigade, a commando brigade and an armored brigade, was concerned. But 48 hours later, the Israeli army decided to also deploy the 36th Division which includes the famous Golani Brigade, the 188th Armored Brigade and the Etzioni Brigade. These are two reconnaissance detachments belonging to the Etzioni brigade and the Golani brigade which were targeted by Hezbollah fighters inside southern Lebanon.
What are Hezbollah’s assets in the event that the Israeli army decides to raise the level of its ground engagement in southern Lebanon?
The land: Unlike Gaza, the Lebanese terrain, made up of rocky mountainous areas and steep hills, offers clear advantages to Hezbollah fighters, who are more mobile and who know their region well, compared to the invasion units which rely heavily on their tanks and their light armored vehicles.
The length of the border: unlike Gaza, whose border with Israel does not exceed 40 km in length, the Lebanese-Israeli border of around a hundred kilometers will force the Israeli army to disperse its forces and offers Hezbollah more mobility. The latter will not be able to defend itself along the entire length of the border but will choose the fixation zones that it deems favorable for a war of movement.
The number of fighters: In Gaza, Hamas and the other components of the Palestinian resistance could only count on a maximum of 30,000 fighters who had to face 5 Israeli divisions which totaled nearly 100,000 men. Hezbollah can mobilize nearly 100,000 fighters on its side. This is the equivalent of the number of Israeli divisions that could be deployed as part of a major land invasion.
Armament: What Hamas sorely lacked and still lacks in Gaza are anti-tank guided missiles. To destroy tanks and other armored vehicles, Hamas uses a modified version of the old RPG from the Soviet era, the famous Yassine 105. To reach their target, Palestinian fighters must approach it within a few dozen meters. On the other hand, Hezbollah has weapons unlike those of Hamas in Gaza. Not only is its arsenal of (Iranian) missiles impressive, but it also has anti-tank guided missiles (an Iranian version of the Russian Kornet missile) which can reach Israeli tanks at a distance of 5 kilometers and which could prove decisive in land battles.
The advantage of tunnels: We know the role played by tunnels in the military resilience of Palestinian fighters in Gaza. Information relating to the tunnels built by Hezbollah shows tunnels that are much longer and better constructed, which is not surprising given the financial and logistical resources available to Hezbollah compared to Hamas.
Military supplies assured: Unlike what is happening in Gaza where the air, naval and land blockade prevents any supply of weapons forcing Hamas to rely only on its workshops and on the recovery of Israeli devices that have not exploded to extract the material. explosive and recycle it for the manufacture of homemade bombs, Hezbollah will be able to count on the porosity of Lebanon’s border with Syria through which it can transport weapons from Iraq and Iran.
If the Palestinian fighters were able to hold out for a year in Gaza despite an absolutely unfavorable balance of military forces, what can we say about Hezbollah, which will be able to count on the numerous comparative advantages mentioned above?
Of course, on a strictly military level, the balance of forces remains to the advantage of the Israeli army which will be able to count in particular on its control of the sky. But no war is won only in the air. The Israeli army has no choice but to confront Hezbollah on the ground if it wants to neutralize its ballistic device.
Furthermore, and even if its numbers allow it to be classified as a quasi-army, Hezbollah is not a regular army and will not fight under the conditions of a conventional war. The war of movement led by seasoned fighters who know their terrain well risks costing the Israeli army dearly. To what extent will this situation influence the outcome of the conflict and favor the diplomatic option?
